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Do promotions benefit manufacturers, retailers or both? 
Abstract 
While there has been strong managerial and academic interest in price promotions, much 
of the focus has been on the impact of such promotions on category sales, brand sales and 
brand choice.  In contrast, little is known about the long-run impact of price promotions 
on manufacturer and retailer revenues and margins, although both marketing researchers 
and practitioners consider this a priority area (Marketing Science Institute 2000). Do 
promotions generate additional revenue and for whom? Which brand, category and 
market conditions influence promotional benefits and their allocation across 
manufacturers and retailers? 
To answer these questions, we conduct a large-scale econometric investigation of 
the effects of price promotions on manufacturer revenues, retailer revenues and margins.  
This investigation proceeds in two steps. First, persistence modeling reveals the short- 
and long-run effects of price promotions on these performance measures. Second, 
weighted least-squares analysis shows to what extent brand and promotion policies, as 
well as market-structure and category characteristics, influence promotional impact.  
A first major finding of our paper is that price promotions do not have permanent 
monetary effects for either party.  Second, in terms of the cumulative, over-time, 
promotional impact on their revenues, we find significant differences between the 
manufacturer and retailer. Price promotions have a predominantly positive impact on 
manufacturer revenues, but their effects on retailer revenues are mixed. Retailer 
(category) margins, in contrast, are typically reduced by price promotions. Even when 
accounting for cross-category and store-traffic effects, we still find evidence that price 
promotions are typically not beneficial to the retailer. Third, our results indicate that 
manufacturer revenue elasticities are higher for promotions of small-share brands and for 
frequently promoted brands. Moreover, they are higher for storable products and lower in 
categories with a high degree of brand proliferation. Retailer revenue elasticities, in turn,  
are higher for brands with frequent and shallow promotions, for storable products and in 
categories with a low extent of brand proliferation.  As such, from a revenue-generating 
point of view, manufacturer and retailer interests are often aligned in terms of which 
categories and brands to promote.  Finally, retailer margin elasticities are higher for 
promotions of small-share brands and for brands with infrequent and shallow promotions. 
Thus, the implications with respect to the frequency of promotions depend upon the 
performance measure the retailer chooses to emphasize. The paper discusses the 
managerial implications of our results for both manufacturers and retailers and suggests 
various avenues for future research.  
 
Key words: Long-term profitability, sales promotions, category management, 
manufacturers versus retailers, empirical generalizations, vector-autoregressive 
models. 
  
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early seventies, price promotions have emerged as an important part of 
the marketing mix, and increasingly they represent the main share of the marketing 
budget for most consumer-packaged goods. An extensive body of academic research has 
established that temporary price reductions substantially increase short-term brand sales 
(see e.g. Blattberg et al. 1995), which may explain their intensity of use by manufacturers 
and retailers alike.  However, the long-term effects of price promotions tend to be much 
weaker. Recent research consistently finds that short-term promotion effects die out in 
subsequent weeks or months -- a period referred to as dust settling -- leaving very few, if 
any, permanent gains to the promoting brand.  This pattern has been shown to hold for 
the market shares of promoting brands (Srinivasan et al. 2000), for category demand 
(Nijs et al. 2001), as well as for consumers' purchase incidence, purchase quantity and 
brand choice (Pauwels et al. 2001).  
From a strategic perspective, these findings imply that promotions generally do not 
generate long-term benefits to the promoting brand beyond those accrued during the dust-
settling period.  By the same token, brands do not suffer permanent damage to their 
market position from competitive promotions either. Therefore, in order to be 
economically viable, promotional actions should be held accountable for net positive 
results during the dust-settling period. This accountability has two components. First, a 
promotion must not initiate a permanent price or margin drop. After the promotion 
period, prices must return to their normal levels lest they cause permanent erosion of 
profit margins without offsetting volume increases. Second, a promotion must generate a 
net surplus (incremental revenue and profit over baseline) for the promoter over the dust-
settling period.  These conditions motivate a fresh look at the economics of promotions 
using metrics such as revenue and margins. Indeed, the focus of past empirical research 
on promotions has been on their volume impact, due to both data limitations and 
marketing’s interest in consumer decision-making. However, for managers, volume is 
just part of the equation. The more relevant business goal is incremental revenue and 
profit (margin) generation, i.e. the question is whether or not promotions are attractive in 
financial terms. 
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In addition, promotions typically involve two parties whose interests need not 
necessarily be aligned: the manufacturer and the retailer. To the manufacturer, volume 
gains may come from two sources: primary-demand expansion and brand switching.  The 
relevant question then becomes whether the added revenues from these incremental sales 
are large enough to compensate for the margin loss on the brand’s baseline volume. To 
the retailer, the financial attractiveness of price promotions is more intricate to assess.  
Not only is the retailer’s performance linked to all brands in the category rather than the 
sales of any one brand (Raju 1992), it also depends on category interdependencies and on 
the store-traffic implications of promotions (Walters and Rinne 1986).  As for volume, 
retailers can benefit from promotions because of primary-demand effects in both the focal 
and complementary categories, while an opposite effect may be observed for substitute 
categories.  As for margin, price promotions may have a dual impact: the per-unit margin 
of the promoted brand is affected, and there may be an increased switching from higher 
to lower-margin brands (or vice versa). Moreover, the revenue and margin implications 
may well vary across different categories or even across brands within the category on 
promotion. 
There is only limited empirical evidence on the overall profitability of a given 
price promotion and its division across manufacturers and retailers. Some argue that, 
while manufacturer profits from promotions have increased at a steady rate, retailers have 
been earning lower profits (Farris and Ailawadi 1992; Ailawadi et al. 1999). Likewise, 
competition among stores may prevent retailers from translating trade allowances into 
profits (Kim and Staelin 1999). By the same token, Srinivasan and Bass (2001) find that 
the intensity of price competition at the retail level exceeds what is optimal for the 
market, but this is not so for manufacturers. In contrast, some believe that power in the 
channel has shifted toward retailers, so their share of promotion profits should be on the 
rise (Kadiyali et al. 2000; see Ailawadi 2001 for an extensive review on this issue). In 
fact, the proliferation of price promotions at the expense of advertising budgets has been 
attributed to the increasing power of retailers (Achenbaum and Mitchel 1987; Olver and 
Farris 1989). Similarly, Nijs et al. (2001) argue that many leading manufacturers would 
like to reduce their excessive reliance on price promotions but are reluctant to do so, lest 
they lose the support of retailers who still appreciate the market expansive power of price 
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promotions.  Interestingly, other sources (see e.g. Urbany et al. 2000) have reported a 
similar discontent with price promotions on the part of retail executives.  
To summarize, price promotions may impact primary demand, selective demand 
and per-unit margins, and their combined or net financial effect for both manufacturers 
and retailers depends on their relative impact on these three performance dimensions.  
Unfortunately, no empirical literature to date has systematically assessed these net effects 
over time.  The research questions we want to address are therefore: (i) are promotions 
financially attractive, (ii) for whom, and (iii) what accounts for the variation in 
promotional benefits across categories and brands?  
To answer these questions, we conduct a large-scale econometric investigation of 
the effects of promotions on manufacturer revenues, retailer revenues and retailer 
margins.1 Given the well-established dynamic nature of promotion response, we adopt 
the time-series framework used in Dekimpe and Hanssens (1995).  Following Nijs et al. 
(2001), our research proceeds in two stages. First, we quantify the promotion impact on 
the relevant dependent variables for a large number of brands and product categories over 
a long time period. Unlike previous studies, we do not limit ourselves to the manufacturer 
(volume) sales, either in relative or absolute terms, but we consider manufacturer 
revenues as well. For the retailer, five performance variables are considered: (i) category 
sales, (ii) category revenue, (iii) category margin, (iv) store traffic, and (v) overall store 
revenues. Second, we explain the observed differences in revenue effects for both 
manufacturers and retailers. As such, our paper provides new insights into the over-time 
financial effects of price promotions, and how they may differ between manufacturers 
and retailers.   
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe VAR modeling, and 
the associated impulse-response functions, as a suitable method for quantifying the 
cumulative promotion effects on manufacturer and retailer performance. We then 
introduce an extensive multi-category scanner database covering seven years of weekly 
promotional activity in a regional market (section 3). In section 4, we report and interpret 
the results of our first-stage estimation for both manufacturers and retailers. 
Having quantified the cumulative promotion effects on performance, we introduce 
the second-stage analysis to examine how brand and category characteristics influence 
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this promotional impact (section 5). Section 6 elaborates on the results for manufacturer 
revenue, retailer revenue and retailer margins. Finally, we formulate overall conclusions 
and suggest limitations and proposed areas for future research in section 7. 
 
2. VAR MODELING OF CUMULATIVE PROMOTIONAL IMPACT 
Recent research has used vector-autoregressive (VAR) modeling to distinguish between 
the short-term and long-term effects of price promotions on different levels of consumer 
demand (Bronnenberg et al. 2000; Dekimpe et al. 1999; Nijs et al. 2001; Pauwels et al. 
2001; Srinivasan et al. 2000). Two major findings emerge from this research stream. 
First, permanent effects are the exception rather than the rule for category sales, brand 
sales (or share) and their components (category incidence, brand choice and purchase 
quantity). While promotions almost always have substantial effects on immediate sales, 
these effects tend to die out over a finite number of weeks (the “dust-settling period”), 
leaving very few, if any, persistent gains to the promoting brand.  Second, the total sales 
impact of a price promotion (immediate and dust-settling effects) is typically positive for 
all sales components. These papers therefore conclude that negative dust-settling effects 
such as post-promotion dips do not offset the immediate gains of price promotions. 
However, because promotions reduce the unit profit margin, increased sales over the total 
effect horizon are only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for promotional 
profitability (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999; Kopalle et al. 1999).  Indeed, the net effect of 
volume increase and price reduction has not been examined to date, nor have the margin 
implications to the retailer of switching among promoted and non-promoted brands.  
VAR models of promotional response are well suited to measure these total or net 
revenue and profit effects. In a VAR model, we assess the net result of a chain of 
reactions initiated by a single promotion.  Specifically, VAR models are designed to not 
only measure direct (immediate and/or lagged) promotional response, but also to capture 
the performance implications of complex feed-forward and feed-back loops. For instance, 
a promotional shock may generate higher retailer revenue, which may induce the retailer 
to promote that brand again in subsequent periods. As a result, other brands may engage 
in their own promotions that mitigate the over-time effectiveness of the initial promotion. 
Because of all these reactions, the total performance implications of the initiating 
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promotional shock may extend well beyond the typical instantaneous and post-
promotional dip effects. Similarly, the effective time span that elapses before all prices in 
the market return to their pre-shock level is expected to exceed the initial nominal 
promotional period of one to two weeks. Our main interest lies in the net (total) results of 
all these actions and reactions, which can be derived from a VAR model through its 
associated impulse-response functions, as discussed in more detail below. 
In this paper, we estimate a sequence of four-equation VAR models per product 
category, where the endogenous variables are the prices for the three major brands (Pi, 
i=1,2,3) and one of the performance measures (PERF). This setting allows us to capture 
(i) the dynamic interrelationships between the considered performance measure and the 
three price (promotion) variables, and (ii) the reaction patterns among the latter. 
Performance may, however, also be affected by a variety of other factors. To that extent, 
in addition to the intercept (a0), we add four sets of exogenous control variables: (i) two 
indicators of feature activity: a “price-special” (SP) and a “bonus-buy” (BB) promotional 
variable for each of the three major brands; (ii) a step dummy variable for the impact of 
new-product introductions (NP), as these have been shown to potentially increase 
category sales (Nijs et al. 2001) and market shares (Kornelis et al. 2001); (iii) four-
weekly seasonal dummy variables (SD) to account for seasonal fluctuations in 
performance and/or marketing spending; and (iv) a deterministic-trend variable t to 
capture the impact of omitted, gradually-changing variables (see Nijs et al. 2001  for a 
similar approach).  
 VAR models can be written in levels, differences or in error-correction format, 
depending on the outcome of preliminary unit-root and cointegration tests. Assuming for 
ease of exposition that all variables are found to be level or trend stationary, the following 
model is specified for each performance variable: 
 
 
5
 
 
 
13
0, ,
2
13
0, 1 , 1 1 1
1, 2
13
2,
0, 2 , 2 2 2
23,
13
0, 3 , 3 3 3
2
PERF s PERF st PERF PERF t
S
t
P s P st P P t
t S
t
P s P st P P t
St
P s P st P P t
S
a a SD t NP
PERF
a a SD t NPP
P
a a SD t NP
P
a a SD t NP
 
 
 
 





 
   
 
   
     
    
   
     
    
 
   
  




11 12 13 14 15 1611 12 13 14
1, 21 22 23 24 25 2621 22 23 24
1 2,31 32 33 34 31 32 33 34 35 36
3,41 42 43 44 41 42 43 44 45 46
i i i i
t i
i i i ik t i
i i i i
i t i
i i i i
t i
PERF
P
P
P
       
        
         
         


 

   
   
        
   
      

1,
2, ,
3, 1,
1, 2,
2, 3,
3,
(1)
t
t PERF t
t P t
t P t
t P t
t
SP
SP
SP
BB
BB
BB




 
              
   
      
 
  
 
where PERFt refers to the performance variable of interest and [PERF,t, P1,t, P2,t, P3,t]’ 
N(0,).2 k refers to the order of the VAR model, which is determined by the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). For the manufacturer, brand sales (S) and manufacturer 
revenue (MR) are used as performance measures, while the five retailer performance 
measures are category sales (CS), total retailer revenue (RR), total retailer margins (RM), 
store revenue (SR) and store traffic (ST).  
In a VAR framework, price promotions are operationalized as temporary price 
shocks, whose over-time impact is quantified through the corresponding impulse-
response functions (see e.g. Dekimpe et al. 1999; Nijs et al. 2001 or Srinivasan et al. 
2000 for technical details). To derive the impulse-response functions (IRFs), we compute 
two forecasts, one based on an information set that does not take the promotion into 
account and one based on an extended information set that takes the promotion into 
account. The difference between the two forecasts measures the incremental effect of the 
price promotion. The impulse-response function (IRF) tracing the incremental impact of 
the price-promotion shock is our basic measure of promotional effectiveness.3 
While impulse-response functions are useful summary devices, the multitude of 
numbers (periods) involved makes them awkward to compare (i) across manufacturers 
and retailers, and (ii) across different brands and product categories.  To reduce this set of 
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numbers to a manageable size, we derive the following three summary statistics from 
each IRF:  
 
(i) the immediate performance impact, which is readily observable to 
managers, and may therefore receive considerable managerial scrutiny, 
(ii) the long-run impact, i.e. the value to which the impulse-response function 
converges, and  
(iii) the combined or total impact over the dust-settling period.  In the absence 
of a permanent impact, this statistic becomes the relevant metric to 
evaluate a promotion’s performance.  
  
Figure 1 shows an example of the incremental effect over time of a price 
promotion of one cent per ounce in the stationary canned-tuna market on the 
manufacturer’s (Panel A) and the retailer’s (Panel B) revenues.  Both parties experience a 
significant and immediate revenue increase in the promotional period, and a noticeable 
post-promotional dip around period 2.  However, in this specific instance, neither player 
experiences a persistent or continuing revenue gain (i.e. the incremental revenue impact 
converges to zero). Furthermore, both the immediate effect ($5,570 versus $1,830) and 
the cumulative impact ($5,010 versus $440) prior to convergence are more pronounced 
for the manufacturer than for the retailer.  This is also the case in Panel C and Panel D, 
which trace the over-time impact of a one-cent price promotion in the stationary cheese 
market, where only the manufacturer (Panel C) enjoys an immediate revenue increase 
($10,010), while both the immediate and cumulative effects (-$11,870 and –$20,380, 
respectively) for the retailer are negative (Panel D).  Hence, in the former case, the 
retailer’s and the manufacturer’s financial interests are aligned, while this is clearly not 
the case in the latter example.  The relevant question then becomes whether these 
examples are the rule, or whether scenarios where the retailer is the main beneficiary, or 
even where both lose revenues are more prevalent.  A large-scale empirical analysis on 
this issue is presented in section 4. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
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The summary statistics depict the incremental performance effects in additional 
(incremental) units or ounces sold (brand and category sales), customers (store traffic) or 
dollars (manufacturer revenues, retailer revenues and margins).  The common dollar 
metric is especially useful to assess the relative financial benefits to, respectively, the 
retailer and the manufacturer for a given price promotion.   When making comparisons 
across brands and product categories, however, one may want to control for scale 
differences, and convert the respective summary statistics to unit-free elasticities.  We 
derive the elasticities at the mean by normalizing the incremental performance by the 
ratio of the sample performance mean to the sample price mean. For tuna, as an example, 
the immediate (cumulative) increase in manufacturer revenue of $5,570 ($5,010) is 
transformed into an elasticity of 3.45 (3.10) by normalizing the incremental performance 
by the ratio of $24,080 (sample mean of weekly manufacturer revenue) to 14.9 cents 
(sample mean of weekly price per ounce of the brand). Similarly, the immediate 
(cumulative) increase in retailer revenue of $1,830 ($440) is transformed into an 
elasticity of 0.20 (0.05) by normalizing the incremental performance by the ratio of the     
$134,240 (sample mean of weekly retailer revenue in the tuna category) to 14.9 cents 
(sample mean of weekly price per ounce of the brand). Using a similar calculation for the 
cheese category, the immediate (cumulative) manufacturer revenue elasticity is 0.99         
(-0.18) while the immediate (cumulative) retailer revenue elasticity is –0.39 (-0.66). 
 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
The database consists of scanner records for twenty-five product categories from a large 
mid-western supermarket chain, Dominick’s Finer Foods. With 96 stores in and around 
Chicago, this chain is one of the two largest in the area.  Relevant variables include unit 
sales at the SKU level, retail and wholesale price (appropriately deflated using the 
Consumer Price Index for the area), price specials, bonus-buy promotions and 
information on new-product introductions.  Moreover, several categories are 
characterized by major new-product introductions, many of them private labels.4 Data are 
available from September 1989 to May 1997, a total of 399 weeks. Beyond the richness 
in performance and control variables, this data set is also very broad as it covers non-food 
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products (e.g. detergents and toothbrushes) and food products, both storable (e.g. canned 
tuna and canned soup) and perishable (e.g. cheese and refrigerated juice).  Research 
problems previously addressed using the Dominick’s data set include store-level 
differences in price sensitivity (Hoch et al. 1995), the customization of marketing-mix 
variables at the store level (Montgomery 1997), the power division between 
manufacturers and retailers (Kadiyali et al. 2000), the retail pass-through for competing 
brands (Besanko et al. 2001) and the relationship between prices and peak demand 
(Chevalier et al. 2000). 
 Summary information on the data set is provided in Table 1. Some of the categories 
have fewer than 399 weeks of data due to missing observations -- the average data length 
is approximately 340 weeks.   
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first data set that documents weekly 
manufacturer and retailer prices for a large number of products. Focusing on the top-three 
brands in each category, we analyze a total of 75 brands. Since manufacturer inferences 
cannot be made for the 19 private-label brands, we restrict our analysis to the 56 national 
brands in assessing the impact of price promotions on manufacturer performance. 
 
Manufacturer performance measures  
For the top-three brands in a category, we consider brand sales as well as manufacturer 
revenues, defined as: 
, ,i t i t t i tMR MS Q WP   ,
  
where MSi,t  refers to market share of brand i at time t, Q t is the category sales and WPi,t is 
the wholesale price of brand i at time t. 
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Retailer performance measures 
For the retailer, a more extensive set of performance measures is considered. In addition 
to category sales, we also derive the total category revenue for the retailer as: 
, ,
1
n
t i t t
i
i tRR MS Q

  P
,
 
where Pi,t refers to the price of brand i at time t and n is the total number of brands in a 
category. As both retailer and manufacturer revenues are expressed in dollars, the relative 
changes in MRi,t and RRt due to a given price promotion will yield insights into the 
division of promotional benefits between manufacturer and retailer. Additionally, we 
compute retailer total category margins (defined in dollars) as: 
 , ,
1
( )
n
t i t t i t i t
i
RM MS Q P W

    P  
We note that the wholesale-price measure WPi,t, which was also used in Besanko et al. 
(2001) and Kadiyali et al. (2000), does not capture the replacement cost of the item in a 
given week, but rather the average acquisition cost (AACi,t) of all items in inventory in 
that week.  AACi,t is obtained as a weighted average of the price paid by the retailer for 
brand i in week t and the retailer’s average acquisition cost in t-1 (For a detailed 
description see http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/mkt/Databases/DFF/W.html). 
Dominick’s may well stock up on inventory during trade deals, in which case the AACi,t 
will remain depressed for some time after the nominal deal period (Chevalier et al. 2000).  
This implies that retailer forward-buying practices are already incorporated in our margin 
and wholesale price measures (see also Besanko et al. 2001 for a similar argument). 
Finally, two store-level performance variables are relevant for the retailer. Store 
revenue is captured by the total dollar sales summed over all Dominick's-defined 
departments for a given week. Store traffic is defined as the total number of customers 
visiting the store and buying at least one item in a given week. 
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Brand characteristics 
A dummy variable indicates whether the promoting brand is a national brand (=1) or a 
private label (=0). The promoting brand’s share is operationalized as the average volume-
based share of the brand. Price promotion frequency is defined as the proportion of weeks 
in which the price of the brand was at least two standard deviations below its average 
price level.  A brand’s price-promotion depth is defined as the (percentage) difference 
between a brand’s promotional price (as defined for promotional frequency) and the 
brand’s average price, averaged across all promotion weeks. This measure was also used 
by Rao, Arjunji and Murthi (1995) and Nijs et al. (2001), among others. The “price-
special” and “bonus-buy” promotional variables for each of the three major brands are 
operationalized as the percentage of SKUs of the brand that are promoted in a given 
week. 
 
Market and category characteristics 
We measure the competitive structure in a given category using two variables. First, 
heterogeneity in brand shares is captured by the variance in shares across brands (Dhar 
and Hoch 1997). Second, the number of SKUs in the category (Narasimhan et al. 1996) 
captures the extent of brand proliferation. Finally, we use the Narasimhan et al. (1996) 
storability scales to construct a dummy variable indicating whether the product category 
is considered perishable (=0) or storable (=1). 
 
4. DO PROMOTIONS INCREASE REVENUES AND MARGINS? 
We first review our results on the temporal behavior of manufacturer sales, category 
sales, manufacturer revenues, retailer revenues, retailer margins, and store revenue and 
store traffic. We then discuss our main findings concerning the magnitude of the 
immediate and total price-promotion effects.5 
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 4.1 Stationarity of the time series  
Table 2 shows the results of the ADF unit-root test. First, for manufacturer sales, we find 
that three of the 56 series are evolving while four of the 56 manufacturer revenue series 
are evolving. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
However, when a correction is made for structural breaks due to new-product 
introductions, those seven series are also re-classified as stationary as well. Second, for 
retailer category sales and category revenues, we find that four of the 25 series are I(1). 
Once again, these evolving series are re-classified as stationary after controlling for the 
new-product introductions in the category. Similarly, with respect to retailer margins, we 
find that three of the 25 series are evolving, but they are re-classified as stationary after 
controlling for the new-product introductions in the category as well. Fourth, the store 
revenue and store traffic series are stationary. Finally, 14 out of the 75 retail price series 
and 16 out of the 75 wholesale price series are classified as evolving according to the 
ADF-tests. Again, all these price series are re-classified as stationary after we account for 
new-product introductions using the Zivot and Andrews (1992) structural break test 
where the break date is determined endogenously.6  
This prevalence of stationarity of marketing series for frequently purchased 
consumer good categories has been reported in previous literature (Dekimpe et al. 1999; 
Srinivasan and Bass 2000; Nijs et al. 2001).  In the terminology of Dekimpe & Hanssens 
(1999), we are observing predominantly “business-as-usual” scenarios. Thus, our 
evidence supports the existing empirical generalization that there are no permanent 
effects of price promotions on volume, i.e. brand sales and category sales. However, we 
offer a new generalization that there are no long-term promotion effects on financial 
performance  (manufacturer and retailer revenues, and retailer margins) and on store 
performance (store revenues and store traffic) either. By contrast, new-product 
introductions can affect long-term financial performance. Specifically, the apparent 
evolution in revenues and margins found in 18 cases is consistently related to major new- 
product introductions, a finding that also extends volume results in prior literature (Nijs et 
al. 2001). 
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 4.2 First-stage results on the over-time effects of price promotions 
4.2.1 Manufacturer performance: brand sales and brand revenues 
Our first-stage analysis reveals a predominantly positive impact of promotions on 
both brand sales and manufacturer revenues (Table 3).  
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
For brand sales, 52 out of the 56 brands (93%) obtain significant total positive effects. To 
assess the size of this effect, we subsequently calculated price-promotion elasticities at 
the mean following the method outlined in section 2. The average (median) immediate 
price-promotion elasticity in Table 4 is 3.77 (3.52) while the average (median) 
cumulative price promotion elasticity is 4.42 (3.76).  
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
With regard to manufacturer revenue, 49 out of 56 brands (88%) obtain significant total 
effects, which are positive in 44 cases (79%) and negative in 5 cases (9%). Thus, the 
predominant finding is that promotions generate incremental manufacturer sales and 
revenue by the end of the dust-settling period. The average (median) immediate price 
promotion elasticity in Table 4 is 2.65 (2.51) while the average (median) cumulative 
price-promotion elasticity is 1.95 (2.01).  
In contrast to Nijs et al. (2001), who find that the immediate promotion effect on 
volume is amplified over time, our results show that the cumulative positive impact on 
manufacturer revenue is smaller than its immediate effect. We attribute this result to the 
fact that wholesale prices take a longer time than sales volumes to return to their pre-
promotion level. As shown in Table 5, the average length of the dust-settling period is 
about 6 weeks for brand sales, but about 8 weeks for wholesale prices.7 In other words, 
sales effects of a promotion die out sooner than wholesale price effects do; the inertia in 
wholesale prices creates a financial penalty to promoters. We discuss the implications of 
this result in the following section. 
 
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
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4.2.2 Retailer performance: category sales and category revenues  
For the retailer's category sales, we observe significant total effects for 53 out of 
the 75 brands, as seen in Table 3.  Compared to 46 brands (62%) with a positive impact, 
only 7 brands (9%) have a negative impact. The average (median) elasticity is 0.54 (0.45) 
for the immediate impact, and 0.87 (0.51) for the total impact.  
Thus promotions generate incremental category sales for the retailer by the end of 
the dust-settling period, a finding that is consistent with Nijs et al. (2001). Their study 
finds positive total effects in 58% of all cases, versus only 5% with negative effects. 
Their average (median) elasticity equals 2.21 (1.75) for the log-log model and 1.98 (1.44) 
for the linear model. The difference in these estimates may be due to country-specific 
differences between the U.S. and the Netherlands or could be due to the fact that Nijs et 
al. (2001) examine category demand at the national level, while we study category sales 
for one large chain in a regional market. Therefore, category-demand effects due to store 
switching are captured to differing degrees in the two studies. We also note that the 
brand-level sales elasticity and the category-level sales elasticity are positive for both the 
manufacturer and the retailer; hence, from a volume perspective, promotional policies are 
attractive for both manufacturers and retailers.  
The results change substantially when focusing on category revenue as opposed to 
volume sales. Indeed, while we observe significant total revenue effects for 49 out of 75 
brands (65%), only 29 (39%) of those are positive, and 20 (26%) have a negative total 
impact. In contrast to manufacturer revenue, the average (median) immediate price-
promotion elasticity is only 0.19 (0.09), and the total price-promotion elasticity is even 
smaller, and becomes –0.05 (0.02). While the immediate price-promotion elasticity is still 
positive, the cumulative price promotion elasticity over the dust-settling period is around 
zero, indicating that the immediate category-revenue expansive effect of a price 
promotion is negated in subsequent periods. A plausible explanation is that retailers’ loss 
of revenue from non-promoted items is about the same or slightly higher than their 
revenue gains from promoted items. As a result, promotional policies are less financially 
attractive to retailers than they are to manufacturers.  
A common finding from Table 4 is that, for both market players, the total 
promotional elasticity exceeds the immediate elasticity for sales, but not for revenues. In 
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other words, the additional effects in the post-promotion weeks tend to be positive for 
sales series, but negative for the revenue series. As mentioned earlier in the context of 
wholesale prices, this result indicates that the price series have more inertia than the 
volume series, i.e. retail prices take more time to revert to their original base level after a 
promotion shock. In fact, Table 5 shows that the length of the dust-settling period is even 
slightly higher for retail prices (about 9 weeks) than for wholesale prices (about 8 weeks). 
In contrast, category sales series revert to their mean level in about 5 weeks. In other 
words, retailers still suffer revenue and margin losses even after the sales effects of a 
promotion have died out. This finding is intriguing, and may result for two reasons: (i) 
intensified competitive reactions that delay a return to their pre-promotional level for 
some of the price series involved  (as elaborated in section 2), and/or (ii) a deliberate 
managerial choice to increase post-promotion prices only in small increments. Indeed, 
retailers may return to regular prices only gradually in order to avoid a sticker-shock 
effect (Greenleaf 1995). VAR models and their associated IRFs are ideally suited to 
capture both phenomena, neither of which would have been picked up in traditional, 
volume-based promotion-response models.  
These findings suggest that, from a financial point of view, managers’ well-
documented focus on immediate results ignores an unexpected side effect of promotions 
(Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999). The danger is not so much that volume sales are 
borrowed from future periods (as we find that dust-settling volume effects are typically 
positive), but that prices tend to stay below baseline prices for several weeks before 
returning to their pre-promotion levels. Note that our results control for the possibility of 
forward buying which depresses the retailer’s wholesale prices due to the AAC procedure 
described in section 3. Absent such forward-buying behavior, the negative financial 
effects of promotions for the retailer would be even higher. 
 
4.2.3 Retailer performance: margin, store revenue and store traffic 
When focusing on margin implications, we find even stronger evidence that price 
promotions are typically not beneficial to retailers. Specifically, only 6 brands (8%) 
experience a positive total impact on category margins while 41 brands (55%) experience 
a negative total impact. The average (median) immediate price-promotion elasticity is     
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–0.33 (0.25) while the corresponding average (median) total price promotion elasticity is 
–1.29 (-0.72). Here too, there are strong negative post-promotion effects on retailer 
margins such that the initial negative impact is worsened.  
These unfavorable results to the retailer could, of course, be mitigated by 
beneficial store-traffic and store-revenue effects of promotions (Blattberg et al. 1995). 
For store revenue, we find significant total effects for only 32 out of 75 brands. Twelve 
brands (16%) experience a positive total impact on store revenue while 20 brands (27%) 
experience a negative total impact. The average (median) immediate price-promotion 
elasticity for store revenue is 0.50 (-0.69) while the corresponding average (median) price 
promotion elasticity is -1.34 (-1.81). The results for store traffic are similar: only 25 out 
of the 75 brands have significant total effects. Nine brands (12%) experience a positive 
total impact, while 16 brands  (21%) experience a negative total impact of price 
promotions on store traffic. All nine brands with a positive impact on store traffic are 
national brands. This validates the theoretical result in Lal and Narasimhan (1996) and 
the empirical generalization in Blattberg et al. (1995) that nationally-advertised brands 
are more effective in generating store traffic than private-label brands. Given this finding, 
it is not surprising that retailers typically use national brands as loss leaders to build store 
traffic (Drèze 1995). The occurrence of negative store-traffic effects, however rare, may 
indicate that promotions can reduce the need for future store visits, as consumers 
stockpile the promoted products. In other words, promotions may train consumers to buy 
more on fewer occasions (Mela et al. 1998). Our result on store traffic validates the 
finding in Hoch et al. (1994), (based on data from field experiments conducted in the 
Dominick’s chain) and others reporting only weak store-substitution effects of 
promotions (see, for example, Kumar and Leone 1988; Walters and Mackenzie 1988). 
Finally, only four of the nine (44%) national brands with positive total impact on store 
traffic also experience a positive total impact on store revenue. Thus, while promotions 
on these national brands build store traffic, these promotions do not increase store 
revenue in more than half the cases. This is likely due to the fact that the additional traffic 
generated by loss-leader promotions consists mainly of cherry-picking consumers. 
Hence, the store traffic and revenue effects of retail promotions are typically 
insignificant, and do not compensate for the negative category-margin impact. Overall, 
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our store impact findings are consistent with the evidence that retail grocery managers 
overestimate the extent of cross-store shopping and the impact of price promotions on 
store traffic, thereby pricing more aggressively than warranted (Urbany et al. 2000).  
In conclusion, after the dust settles, price promotions have a predominantly 
positive impact on manufacturer sales, manufacturer revenues and category sales, a small 
effect on store revenue and store traffic, a slightly negative effect on retailer revenues, 
and a decidedly negative effect on retailer margins. The opposite financial results for 
manufacturers versus retailers invite the question to what extent the retailer can extract a 
fixed compensation from the manufacturer, such that promotions have at least a neutral 
effect on retailer margins. Indeed, recent survey research has suggested that retailers 
make increasing use of promotional allowances (Bloom et al. 2000). In order to answer 
this question, we compare the magnitude of the positive manufacturer revenue impact 
with that of the negative retailer revenue impact due to promotions. In Table 3, of the 14 
(20) brands that had negative immediate (cumulative) retailer revenue impact, 11 (18) are 
national brands while the rest are private label brands. Focusing on these national brands, 
if only immediate effects are measured, the compensation potential is weak, i.e. for only 
one of the 11 brands (9%) with negative retailer revenue impact does the promotion-
generated financial gain for the manufacturer exceed the retailer’s loss.  Furthermore, 
when modeling total promotional impact, for only two out of the 18 national brands 
(11%) with negative revenue impact for the retailer is there sufficient potential for side 
payments.  Obviously, these findings do not imply that it is impossible for the retailer to 
extract larger side payments from the manufacturer. However, in that case, the total 
channel gain from the promotion would become negative. 
 
4.3. Split-sample analysis on the robustness of the key findings 
To assess the time-robustness of our results, we determine to what extent they are 
sensitive to the sample time window.  Such a test is possible in our context because we 
have over seven years of consecutive weekly observations. Using the same VAR 
specification as in section 2, we perform a longitudinal split-half validation around the 
mid-date 11/25/1993, which generates two sample periods of approximately 200 weeks 
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each, still sufficiently large samples for VAR estimation.  This resulted in an estimation 
of over 250 additional VAR systems.  
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
For each of the considered performance measures, we use the impulse response 
functions to derive the mean (median) immediate and total (cumulative) promotional 
elasticity estimates. These estimates, shown in Table 6, are of the same sign and very 
close in magnitude for all performance metrics, indicating that our substantive findings 
on promotional effectiveness are robust over time.   
Overall, our results indicate that the interests of manufacturers and retailers are 
not necessarily aligned. It is therefore important to understand the drivers of promotional 
revenue generation, so that well-informed decisions can be made on promotional strategy 
and revenue sharing.  This is the subject of section 5.  
 
5. DRIVERS OF PROMOTIONAL PERFORMANCE  
5.1 Second-stage analysis: moderators and methodology 
Our first-stage results revealed that, on average, price promotions are not 
advantageous for the retailer. However, we expect that this general finding is moderated 
by several characteristics of the brand and the category. The second stage of our research 
explores several drivers of promotional impact on financial performance variables. 
Specifically, we consider two categories of variables: brand characteristics (market share, 
private label versus national brand, promotional depth and promotional frequency) and 
category characteristics (market concentration, SKU proliferation and product 
storability).  Previous literature on these characteristics (e.g. Blattberg et al. 1995; 
Narasimhan et al. 1996; Bell et al. 1999; Nijs et al. 2001) allows us to formulate 
expectations for their moderating effect on total promotional elasticity. However, most of 
these references consider the volume (q) impact of promotions, whereas we focus on the 
revenue (p*q) impact. Some of the moderating factors may impact price as well (e.g. 
Narasimhan 1988; Blattberg et al. 1995), and we have little knowledge on their combined 
impact on the financial performance variables. As such, while previous literature is 
helpful in identifying factors that may moderate the total promotional impact, our second-
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stage analysis is mostly explorative in nature. Table 7 highlights the previous literature 
that serves as a basis for including these factors. 
--- Insert Table 7 about here --- 
Econometrically, this stage uses weighted least-squares estimation of three second-stage 
equations, using the promotional impact on manufacturer revenues, retailer revenues and 
retailer margins as the dependent variables. The weights are the inverse of the standard 
errors of the dependent variables and account for the bias caused by statistical error 
around our first-stage estimates.  
 
5.2 Results of second-stage analysis 
The basic correlation matrix, shown in Table 8, indicates that the extent of correlation 
among the key characteristics of interest is quite small. The findings of our second-stage 
analysis are presented in Table 9. In our discussion, we focus on the moderating effect of 
the brand and category characteristics at hand on the total promotional impact on our 
three financial measures: (i) manufacturer revenue, (ii) retailer revenue, and (iii) retailer 
category margin. 
 
--- Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here --- 
 
 
5.2.1 Manufacturer revenue 
 Table 9 shows that the total promotional impact on manufacturer revenue is 
moderated by the market share and the promotional frequency of the promoting brand, as 
well as by the product storability and SKU proliferation of the category. We elaborate on 
these results below.  
The higher the market share of the promoting brand, the lower the total 
promotional impact on manufacturer revenue. This result extends previous findings on 
the immediate effects (Blattberg et al. 1995; Bell et al. 1999) and on the total effects 
(Pauwels 1999) of promotions on selective demand. High-share brands are likely to 
operate on the flat portion of their sales response functions. These brands therefore 
experience 'excess' loyalty and lower selective demand effects (Fader and Schmittlein 
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1993). Moreover, high-share brands lose more money on subsidized baseline sales, i.e. 
sales that would have occurred even in the absence of a price promotion (Narasimhan 
1988).  
 The higher the promotional frequency, the higher the promotional impact on 
manufacturer revenue. This result extends recent findings that the total promotional 
impact increases with promotional frequency for selective demand (Pauwels 1999). 
Frequent promotions may make promotions salient to the consumer, and thus increase 
promotional response (Dickson and Sawyer 1990). Moreover, they may raise the 
awareness of the brand so that consumers consider it for future purchase (Siddarth et al. 
1995).  
As for category characteristics, the extent of SKU proliferation has a significant 
negative impact on the total promotional impact on manufacturer revenue. This result 
extends the findings by Narasimhan et al. (1996) that categories with many brands obtain 
a lower immediate promotional response. There are two behavioral explanations for these 
findings. First, brand proliferation within a category may imply that there are several 
market segments in the category, and hence ample room for product differentiation. This 
differentiation implies less brand switching by consumers, and thus a lower promotional 
impact on selective demand (Narasimhan et al. 1996). Our alternative explanation refers 
to a category crowding effect. The smaller the number of SKUs in the category, the more 
a promotion will stand out and influence consumer category incidence and brand choice. 
In contrast, the promotional impact may be diluted in crowded categories with a large 
number of other SKUs.  
Finally, we find that the promotional impact on manufacturer revenue is higher 
for storable products than for perishable products. This result extends the volume 
findings by Bell et al. (1999) for the immediate effects, and the volume findings by 
Pauwels et al. (2001) for the total effects. Storable products are by definition easier to 
stockpile, which increases consumer willingness to buy them in large quantities (Wansink 
et al. 1998; Bell et al. 1999). Moreover, product inventory at home typically increases 
consumption rates (Ailawadi and Neslin 1998), which may cause additional purchases 
over the dust-settling period. 
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5.2.2 Retailer category revenue and category margin 
 Table 9 shows that the total promotional impact on category revenue is moderated 
by the promotional frequency and promotional depth of the promoting brand as well as 
by the product storability and SKU proliferation of the category. In contrast, category 
margin elasticities are moderated by the market share, promotional frequency and 
promotional depth of the promoting brand. 
 The higher the brand’s market share, the lower the total promotional impact on 
the retailer category margin. This finding is important because retailers typically promote 
high-share brands in order to draw consumers to the category (Bronnenberg and Mahajan 
2001). Our results imply that, even though high-share brands may have a stronger 
category drawing power (Bell et al. 1999), this advantage is offset by the margin loss on 
subsidized baseline sales. This explanation is consistent with the negative effect of 
market share on manufacturer revenue elasticity. In other words, both retailers and 
manufacturers obtain a higher promotional impact on financial performance if small-
share brands are promoted.  
 The higher the brand’s promotional frequency, the higher the promotional impact 
on retailer revenue, but the lower the promotional impact on retailer margin. The first 
finding extends recent volume-based category demand results (Nijs et al. 2001). 
Behavioral explanations are similar to those for manufacturer revenue. In contrast, retail 
margin effects (which are already negative on average) are further reduced for brands 
with high promotional frequency. This finding may indicate that frequent use of 
promotions erodes unit margins because consumers learn to expect them (Assunçao and 
Meyer 1993). Jedidi et al. (1999, p.18) conclude that “promotions make it more difficult 
to increase regular prices and increasingly greater discounts need to be offered to have 
the same effect on consumers' choice”. Our findings contrast the revenue and margin 
effects of promotions, and may imply conflicts of interest. From the manager's 
standpoint, revenue effects (typically positive) of price promotions are easier to assess 
while the margin effects (typically negative) are harder to assess. In fact, based on a 
survey of practitioners, Bucklin and Gupta (1999, p. 269) state that “marketing managers 
seldom evaluate profit impact”. As a result, marketing managers find promotions 
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attractive and allocate resources to them. Financial performance may get hurt in the 
process, however, as evidenced by their negative impact on retailer margins. 
 Promotional depth has a negative impact on the total promotional elasticity on 
both retailer revenues and margins, extending previous literature on demand effects. 
Decreasing returns to deal depth are intuitive given limitations to increases in selective 
and primary demand. Category demand gains are limited by consumers' ability to 
transport and stockpile products. Selective demand gains are limited by the existence of 
loyal segments for non-promoted brands. Just as deeper discounts yield lower discount 
sales elasticities (Jedidi et al. 1999), they worsen the negative margin impact of 
promotions.  
The extent of brand proliferation has a significant negative impact on the 
promotional revenue elasticity, but not on the promotional margin elasticity. The finding 
for retailer revenue elasticity is consistent with that for manufacturer revenue elasticity. 
Moreover, the same behavioral explanations apply (Narasimhan et al. 1996). In contrast, 
retailer margin effects do not depend on the SKU proliferation in the category.  
Finally, storable products obtain higher promotional effects on category revenues. 
This result extends the volume findings by Raju (1992) and Narasimhan et al. (1996) for 
the immediate effects, and the volume findings by Pauwels et al. (2001) for the total 
effects. Similar to our findings for market share, manufacturer and retailer interests are 
aligned. As a result, promoting small brands in storable categories is more likely to 
maximize promotional revenue response for both manufacturers and retailers.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have investigated the manufacturer revenue, the retailer revenue and the 
retailer margin effects of price promotions for twenty-five categories over 399 weeks. 
The breadth of the sample allows us to derive empirical generalizations on price-
promotion effectiveness and its drivers. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the 
first large-scale investigation of the revenue and margin effects of promotions for 
manufacturers versus retailers. We group our findings on duration, magnitude and 
moderators of promotional revenue effect and summarize as follows:   
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(i) Revenue effects materialize over a promotional-dust settling period spanning 
several weeks, but they are not permanent. Manufacturer revenue, retailer revenue 
and retailer margins are predominantly stationary, i.e. when shocked by 
promotion or other events, they revert to their mean or deterministic trend. 
Consequently, promotional planning is more tactical than strategic. As such, each 
promotion should be evaluated based on its own financial impact over the dust-
settling period. Moreover, the inertia (time-to-mean-reversion) of wholesale and 
retail prices is generally higher than that of sales volumes, which cause the 
cumulative financial impact of a promotion to be lower than its immediate impact.  
(ii) Over the dust-settling period, price promotions have positive revenue effects for 
manufacturers (in almost all cases) and retailers (in some instances), but with 
regard to margins, they are typically not beneficial for the retailer. Consequently, 
manufacturer side payments are needed in order to offset retailer losses. However, 
only in a small fraction of the cases is there sufficient manufacturer surplus to 
allow for such side payments. Thus, the financial interests of manufacturers and 
retailers are not guaranteed to be aligned in the promotional game.   
(iii) There are significant moderators of promotional effectiveness. First, manufacturer 
revenue elasticities are higher for low-share brands, for brands with high 
promotional frequency, for storable products and in categories with few SKUs. 
Similarly, retailer revenue elasticities are higher for brands with frequent and 
shallow promotions, for storable products and in categories with few SKUs. From 
a revenue perspective, manufacturer and retailer interests are therefore often 
aligned in terms of what categories and brands to promote. Third, retailer margin 
elasticities are higher for small-share brands with shallow promotions, but lower 
for brand with frequent promotions. Whether or not promotional frequency is 
beneficial therefore depends on the performance measure that retailers choose to 
emphasize.  
  
Our study has several limitations, which offer useful avenues for future research.  
First, we had access to data from one supermarket chain only, Dominick’s, in one 
geographic region (the Chicago area).  While Dominick’s is one of the largest chains in 
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the area, some store switching might take place as a result of price promotions that is not 
captured in our study.  Moreover, our results may depend on both the pass-through 
strategy of this specific retailer and on the competitive landscape in which it operates.  
Depending on the relative power of other retailers (relative to their suppliers but also to 
their local competition), some of our findings may be affected, necessitating further 
research that allows for variation along this dimension.  Second, we had information on 
margins and wholesale prices, but there are other promotional expenses the manufacturer 
may incur on which no information was available, such as slotting allowances, buy-back 
charges, failure fees, etc… Our result that in about ninety percent of the cases, the extra 
revenues generated for the manufacturer may be insufficient to cover the retailer’s 
revenue loss is therefore a conservative benchmark, and more detailed analyses would be 
advisable once the necessary data are available.  Third, our analysis aggregates sales data 
across the different stores of the supermarket chain, which may have caused some 
aggregation bias.  However, over the period of study, Dominick’s conducted a chain-
wide promotional strategy in which prices were lowered uniformly across all stores in the 
chain for a given item (Hoch et al. 1995, Montgomery 1997).  Therefore, potential biases 
due to aggregation across stores with different promotional policies are not a major issue 
in our study (Allenby and Rossi 1991).  Aside from this aggregation across stores, we 
also aggregated across SKUs, and more research is needed to assess the sensitivity of our 
substantive findings to this practice. Fourth, we could expand our framework to explicitly 
account for the impact of changes in other marketing-mix variables, such as e.g. 
advertising, in response to the initial price promotion. Moreover, future research could 
allow for non-linear relations between promotional impact and the second-stage 
characteristics. Fifth, our findings are based on data from well-established, mature 
product categories. Since promotions often work better for new products, more research 
is needed on whether these findings can be generalized to new product categories. Sixth, 
several observations in our second-stage regression may violate the independence 
assumption, as they belong to the same product category.  While Sethuraman et al. (1999) 
apply a generalized least-squares procedure to unweighted observations to account for 
such dependencies, more research is needed to extend their approach to the weighted 
least-squares procedure used here.  Finally, our results allow for a direct revenue 
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comparison between manufacturers and retailers.  Margin implications, in contrast, could 
only be derived for the retailer.  Data on manufacturer margins would be highly desirable 
for a direct assessment of promotional profitability for manufacturers, and consequently, 
for their latitude in using incentive payments to retailers. 
 
25
 
 
 
References 
Achenbaum, Alvin A. and Kent F. Mitchel (1987), “Pulling away from push marketing,” 
Harvard Business Review, (May-June), 38-40. 
 
Ailawadi, Kusum (2001), “The retail power-performance conundrum: What have we 
learned?” Journal of Retailing, forthcoming. 
 
Ailawadi, Kusum L., Paul Farris, and Ed Shames (1999), “Trade promotion: Essential to 
selling through resellers,” Sloan Management Review, 41 (1), 83-92. 
 
Ailawadi, Kusum L. and Scott A. Neslin (1998), “The effect of promotion on 
consumption: Buying more and consuming it faster,” Journal of Marketing Research,  
35 (3), 390-398. 
 
Allenby, Greg and Peter Rossi (1991), “There is no aggregation bias: Why macro logit 
models work,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 9 (1), 1-14. 
 
Assunçao, Joao L. and Robert J. Meyer (1993), “The rational effect of price promotions 
on sales and consumption,” Management Science, 39 (5), 517-535. 
 
Bawa, Kapil, Jane T. Landweshr, and Aradhna Krishna (1989), “Consumer response to 
retailers’ marketing environments: An analysis of coffee purchase data,” Journal of 
Retailing, 65 (Winter), 471-495. 
 
Bell, David R., Jeongwen Chiang, and V. Padmanabhan (1999), “The decomposition of 
promotional response: An empirical generalization,” Marketing Science, 18 (4), 504-526. 
 
Besanko, David, Jean-Pierre Dubé, and Sachin Gupta (2001), “Retail pass-through for 
competing brands,” Working paper, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 
Northwestern University. 
 
Blattberg, Robert, Richard Briesch, and Ed Fox (1995), “How promotions work,” 
Marketing Science, 14 (3), G122-132. 
 
Blattberg, Robert and Kenneth Wisniewski (1989), “Price-induced patterns of 
competition,” Marketing Science, 8 (4), 291-309. 
Bloom, Paul, Gregory Gundlach, and Joseph Cannon (2000), “Slotting allowances and 
fees: Schools of thought and the views of practicing managers,” Journal of Marketing, 64 
(2), 92-108. 
 
Bolton, Ruth N. (1989), “The relationship between market characteristics and 
promotional price elasticities,” Marketing Science, 8 (Spring), 153-169. 
 
 
Bronnenberg, Bart J. and Vijay Mahajan (2001), “Unobserved retailer behavior in 
multimarket data: Joint spatial dependence in market shares and promotion variables,” 
Marketing Science, forthcoming. 
Bronnenberg, Bart J., Vijay Mahajan, and Wilfred Vanhonacker (2000), “The emergence 
of market structure in new repeat-purchase categories: A dynamic approach and an 
empirical application,” Journal of Marketing Research, 37 (1), 16-31. 
Bucklin, Randolph and Sunil Gupta (1999), “Commercial use of UPC scanner data,” 
Marketing Science, 17 (3), 247-273. 
Chevalier, Judith A., Anil K. Kashyap, and Peter E. Rossi (2000), “Why don’t prices rise 
during periods of peak demand? Evidence from Scanner Data,” Working paper, 
University of Chicago GSB. 
Dekimpe, Marnik and Dominique Hanssens (1995), “The persistence of marketing effects 
on sales,” Marketing Science, 14 (1), 1-21. 
Dekimpe, Marnik and Dominique Hanssens (1999), “Sustained spending and persistent 
response: A new look at long-term marketing profitability,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 36 (November), 397-412. 
Dekimpe, Marnik, Dominique Hanssens, and Jorge Silva-Risso (1999), “Long-run effects 
of price promotions in scanner markets,” Journal of Econometrics, 89 (1/2), 269-291. 
Dhar, Sanjay and Stephen J. Hoch (1997), “Why store brand penetration varies by 
retailer,” Marketing Science, 16 (3), 208-277. 
 
Dickey, D.A. and W.A. Fuller (1979), “Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive 
time series with a unit root,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427-
431. 
Dickson, Peter R. and Alan G. Sawyer (1990), “The price knowledge and search of 
supermarket shoppers,” Journal of Marketing, 54 (3), 42-53. 
 
Drèze, Xavier (1995), “Loss leader and cherry picking: A theoretical and empirical 
analysis,” Unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 
Chicago, IL. 
 
Evans, Lewis and Graeme Wells (1983), "An Alternative Approach to Simulating VAR 
models," Economic Letters, 12 (1), 23-29. 
 
Fader, Peter S. and David C. Schmittlein (1993),  “Excess behavioral loyalty for high-
share brands: Deviations from the Dirichlet model for repeat purchasing,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 30 (4), 478-493. 
 
Farris, Paul and Kusum L. Ailawadi (1992), “Retail power: Monster or mouse?” Journal 
of Retailing, 68 (Winter), 351-369. 
 
Greenleaf, Eric A. (1995), “The impact of reference price effects on the profitability of 
price promotions,” Marketing Science, 14 (1), 82-104. 
 
Helsen, Kristan and David Schmittlein (1992), “Some characterizations of stockpiling 
behavior under uncertainty,” Marketing Letters, 3, 5-16. 
 
Hoch, Stephen J., Xavier Drèze, Mary E. Purk (1994), “EDLP, Hi-Lo and margin 
arithmetic,” Journal of Marketing, (October), 16-27. 
 
Hoch, Stephen J., Byung-do Kim, Alan L. Montgomery, and Peter E. Rossi (1995), 
“Determinants of store-level price elasticity,” Journal of Marketing Research, 32 (1), 17-
29. 
 
Jedidi, Kamel, Carl F. Mela, and Sunil Gupta (1999), “Managing advertising and 
promotion for long-run profitability,” Marketing Science, 10 (1), 1-23. 
  
Kadiyali, Vrinda, Pradeep Chintagunta, and Naufel Vilcassim (2000), “Manufacturer-
retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power: An empirical 
investigation of pricing in a local market,” Marketing Science, 19 (2), 127-148.  
 
Kalyanaram, Gurumurthy and John D.C. Little (1994), "An Empirical Analysis of 
Latitude of Price Acceptance in Consumer Package Goods," Journal of Consumer 
Research, 21, 408-418. 
 
Krishnamurthi, Lakshman and S.P. Raj (1991), "An Empirical Analysis of the 
Relationship Between Brand Loyalty and Consumer Price Elasticity," Marketing Science, 
10 (Spring), 172-183.  
 
Kim, S. Y. and Richard Staelin (1999), “Manufacturer allowances and retailer pass-
through rates in a competitive environment,” Marketing Science,18 (1), 59-76. 
 
Kopalle, Praveen, Carl Mela, and Lawrence Marsh (1999), “The dynamic effect of 
discounting on sales: Empirical evidence and normative pricing implications,” Marketing 
Science, 18 (3), 317-332. 
 
Kornelis, Marcel, Peter Leeflang, and Marnik Dekimpe (2001), “Modeling market shake-
ups caused by new entrants,” paper presented at the Marketing Science Institute 
conference at Cambridge, MA. 
 
Kumar, V. and Robert P. Leone (1988), “Measuring the effect of retail store promotions 
on brand and store substitution,” Journal of Marketing Research, 25, 178-185. 
 
Lal, Rajiv and Chakravarthi Narasimhan (1996), “The inverse relationship between 
manufacturer and retailer margins: A theory,” Marketing Science, 15 (2), 132-151. 
 
Marketing Science Institute, 2000.  Research Priorities 2000-2002.  Cambridge, MA.  
 
 
Mela, Carl F., Sunil Gupta, and Kamel Jedidi (1998), "Assessing Long Term Promotional 
Influences on Market Structure," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 15 (2), 
89-107.  
 
Mela, Carl F., Sunil Gupta, and Donald R. Lehmann (1997), “The long-term impact of 
promotion and advertising on consumer brand choice,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
34 (2), 248-261. 
 
Montgomery, Alan L. (1997), “Creating micro-marketing pricing strategies using 
supermarket scanner data,” Marketing Science, 16 (4), 315-337. 
 
Narasimhan, Chakravarthi (1988), “Competitive promotional strategies,” Journal of 
Business, 61 (4), 427-449. 
 
Narasimhan, Chakravarthi, Scott A. Neslin, and Subrata K. Sen (1996), “Promotional 
elasticities and category characteristics,” Journal of Marketing, 60 (2), 17-31. 
 
Nijs, Vincent, Marnik Dekimpe, Jan-Benedict. E.M. Steenkamp, and Dominique 
Hanssens (2001), “The category demand effects of price promotions,” Marketing 
Science, 20 (1), 1-22. 
 
Olver, James M. and Paul W. Farris (1989), “Push and pull: a one-two punch for 
packaged products,” Sloan Management Review, (Fall), 53-61. 
 
Pauwels, Koen (1999), “Pricing policies, brand franchise and competitive environment: 
What drives total promotional effectiveness?” Research paper, Anderson Graduate 
School of Management, UCLA. 
 
Pauwels, Koen, Dominique Hanssens, and S. Siddarth (2001), “The long-term effects of 
price promotions on category incidence, brand choice and purchase quantity,” Working 
paper, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. 
 
Perron, Pierre (1989), “The great crash, the oil price shock and the unit root hypothesis,” 
Econometrica, 57 (6), 1361-1401. 
 
Powers, Keiko, Dominique Hanssens, Hser Yih-ing, and Anglin M. Douglas (1991), 
“Measuring the long-term effects of public policy: The case of narcotics use and property 
crime,” Management Science, 37 (6), 627-644. 
 
Putsis, William and Ravi Dhar (1999), “Category expenditure, promotion and 
competitive market interactions: Can promotions really expand the pie?” Working paper, 
London Business School.   
 
Raju, Jagmohan (1992), “The effect of price promotions on variability in product 
category sales,” Marketing Science, 11 (Summer), 207-20. 
 
Rao, Ram C., Ramesh V. Arjunji, and B. P. S. Murthi (1995), “Game theory and 
empirical generalizations concerning competitive promotions,” Marketing Science, 14 
(3), G89-G100. 
Sethuraman, Raj, V. Srinivasan, and Doyle Kim (1999), “Asymmetric and neighborhood 
cross-price effects: Some empirical generalizations,” Marketing Science, 18 (1), 23-41. 
 
Siddarth, S., Randolph E. Bucklin, and Donald G. Morrison (1995), “Making the cut: 
Modeling and analyzing choice set restriction in scanner panel data,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 32 (3), 255-266. 
 
Sivakumar, K. and S. P. Raj (1997), “Quality tier competition: How price change 
influences brand choice and category choice,” Journal of Marketing, 61 (3), 71-84. 
 
Srinivasan, Shuba and Frank M. Bass (2000), “Cointegration analysis of brand sales and 
category sales: Stationarity and long-run equilibrium in market shares,” Applied 
Stochastic Models in Business and Industry, 16, 159-177. 
 
Srinivasan, Shuba and Frank M. Bass (2001), “Diagnosing competitive responsiveness: 
Disentangling retailer-induced and manufacturer-induced reactions,” paper presented at 
the MSI conference at Cambridge, MA. 
 
Srinivasan, Shuba, Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, and Frank M. Bass (2000), “Market share 
response and competitive interaction: The impact of temporary, evolving and structural 
changes in prices,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 17 (4), 281-305. 
 
Urbany, Joel E., Peter Dickson, and Alan Sawyer (2000), “Insights into cross- and 
within-store price search: Retailer estimates vs. consumer self-reports,” Journal of 
Retailing, 76 (2), 243-258. 
 
Walters, Rockney G. and Hekki Rinne (1986), “An empirical investigation into the 
impact of price promotions on retail store performance,” Journal of Retailing, 62 (3), 
237-266. 
 
Walters, Rockney G. and S. B. MacKenzie (1988), “A structural equation analysis of the 
impact of price promotions on store performance,” Journal of Marketing Research, 25, 
51-63. 
 
Wansink, Brian, Robert J. Kent, and Stephen J. Hoch (1998), “An anchoring and 
adjustment model of purchase quantity decisions,” Journal of Marketing Research, 35 
(1), 71-81. 
 
Zivot, Eric and Donald W. K. Andrews (1992), “Further evidence on the great crash, the 
oil-price shock, and the unit-root hypothesis,” Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, 10 (3), 251-270. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Dominick’s Database* 
Category Starting date Ending Date Weeks 
Analgesics 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Beer 06/06/1991 10/05/1995 227 
Bottled juice 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Cereals 09/14/1989 02/09/1995 283 
Cheese 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Cookies 09/14/1989 10/06/1994 265 
Crackers 09/14/1989 09/08/1994 261 
Canned soup 09/14/1989 04/17/1997 397 
Dish detergent 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Front-end candies 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Frozen dinners 05/28/1992 05/01/1997 258 
Frozen juice 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Fabric softener 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Laundry detergents 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Oatmeal 06/06/1991 05/01/1997 309 
Paper towels 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Refrigerated juice 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Soft drinks 09/14/1989 07/14/1995 253 
Shampoos 02/20/1992 02/09/1995 156 
Snack crackers 09/14/1989 10/06/1994 265 
Soaps 01/09/1992 05/01/1997 278 
Toothbrushes 09/14/1989 05/01/997 399 
Canned tuna 09/14/1989 01/11/1996 331 
Toothpaste 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
Bathroom tissue 09/14/1989 05/01/1997 399 
 
Table 2: Unit-root testsa 
ADF unit root test Evolving after exogenous break testb Evolving after endogenous break testc  
Stationary    Evolving
Manufacturer Performance 
Brand sales 
Manufacturer revenue 
 
53 
52 
 
3 
4 
 
0 
0 
 
- 
- 
Retailer Performance 
Category sales 
Retailer revenue 
Retailer margins 
Store revenue 
Store traffic 
 
21 
21 
22 
1 
1 
 
4 
4 
3 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Price Series 
Retail price 
Wholesale price 
 
61 
59 
 
14 
16 
 
1 
3 
 
0 
0 
a- All series in the table are stationary at the 5% levels with the exception of one retail price series and four wholesale price series that are stationary at the 10% level using the 
ADF unit-root test. 
b- Perron break test (1989) 
c- Zivot and Andrews break test (1992) 
  
 
Table 3: Total promotional impact for manufacturers and the retailer 
 Immediate promotional effects Total (cumulative) promotional effects 
 Positive           
effect* 
No significant 
effect 
Negative         
effect* 
Positive                
effect* 
No significant 
effect 
Negative              
effect* 
Manufacturer Performance       
Brand sales (units, pounds…) 56 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 52 (93%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 
Manufacturer revenue (dollars) 56 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 44 (79%) 7 (12%) 5 (9%) 
Retailer Performance       
Category sales (units, pounds…) 53 (71%) 14 (19%) 8 (10%) 46 (62%) 22 (29%) 7 (9%) 
Retailer revenue (dollars) 35 (47%) 26 (35%) 14 (18%) 29 (39%) 26 (35%) 20 (26%) 
Retailer margins (dollars)  9  (12%) 31 (41%) 35 (47%) 6  (8%) 28 (37%) 41 (55%) 
Store revenue (dollars) 16 (21%) 45 (61%) 14 (18%) 12 (16%) 43 (57%) 20 (27%) 
Store traffic (customers)                             8  (11%) 54 (72%) 13 (17%) 9 (12%) 50 (67%) 16 (21%) 
*Percentages reflect the proportion of estimated elasticities that were found to differ significantly from zero (p < 0.05). 
  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for immediate and total price-promotion elasticities for the different performance series 
 
 Immediate promotional effects Total (cumulative) promotional effects 
 Mean (Median) Mean (Median) 
Manufacturer Performance   
Brand sales  3.77 (3.52)  4.42 (3.76) 
Manufacturer revenue  2.65 (2.51)  1.95 (2.01) 
Retailer performance  
Category sales  0.54 (0.45)   0.87 (0.51) 
Retailer revenue  0.19 (0.09) -0.05 (0.02) 
Retailer margins -0.33 (-0.25) -1.29 (-0.72) 
Store revenue  0.50 (-0.69) -1.34  (-1.81) 
Store traffic 0.13 (-0.85) -0.06  (0.01) 
 
  
Table 5: Time to mean reversion for sales and price  
 
 
Variable  
 
Time to mean reversion* 
 
 
Manufacturer   
 
 
 
Brand sales   
 
 
6.0 weeks  (3.4 ) 
 
Wholesale price   
  
 
8.3 weeks  (5.9) 
 
 
Retailer   
 
 
 
Category sales   
 
 
5.0  weeks (2.6) 
 
Retail price   
 
 
9.4 weeks  (6.9) 
 
*   The cut-off point is determined when the impulse response parameter is no longer significantly different from zero, using  
     the criterion  |t-value| > 1.00 and  > 1.65 (between brackets).
  
Table 6: Split-sample validation – mean price-promotion elasticities for the different performance series* 
 
 Immediate
promotional 
effects 
 Immediate 
promotional 
effects 
 
Immediate 
promotional 
effects 
Total 
(cumulative) 
promotional 
effects                    
Total 
(cumulative) 
promotional 
effects 
Total 
(cumulative) 
promotional 
effects 
 Full sample  Sample 1** Sample 2** Full sample Sample 1** Sample 2** 
Manufacturer Performance       
Brand sales  3.77  3.52   3.84   4.42  3.92  4.21  
Manufacturer revenue  2.65  2.36  2.73   1.95  1.77  2.05  
Retailer Performance       
Category sales  0.54  0.49   0.60   0.87  0.60  0.89  
Retailer revenue  0.19  0.15   0.20  -0.05 -0.12  -0.04 
Retailer margins -0.33 -0.27  -0.34  -1.29 -1.32  -1.12  
Store revenue 0.50  0.65  0.46  -1.34 -0.99  -1.34  
Store traffic 0.13 0.23  0.10  -0.06 -0.02  -0.17  
 
*To avoid information overload, we only report the mean results for each sample. The results on the median are equally robust.  
**Sample 1 is from starting date (shown in Table 1 for each category) to 11/25/1993, while Sample 2 is from 11/25/1993 to ending date (shown in Table 1).  
 
  
 Table 7: Literature support for the drivers of promotional impact   
 
 
Drivers  Brand sales Category sales Price 
 
 
Brand characteristics 
 
National brands 
 
Allenby and Rossi (1991) 
 
Putsis and Dhar (1999) 
Pauwels (1999) 
Sivakumar and Raj  (1997) 
Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) 
Narasimhan  (1988) 
Market share Blattberg et al. (1995) 
Bolton (1989) 
Fader and Schmittlein (1993) 
Pauwels (1999) 
Blattberg et al. ( 1995) 
Bell et al. (1999) 
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1991) 
Bronnenberg and Mahajan (2001) 
Blattberg et al. (1995) 
Narasimhan (1988) 
Promotion frequency 
 
Dickson and Sawyer (1990) 
Siddharth et al. (1995) 
Jedidi et al. (1999) 
Bell et al. (1999) 
Nijs et al. (2001) 
Mela et al. (1997; 1998) 
Assuncao and Meyer (1993) 
Promotion depth 
 
Kalyanaram and Little (1994) Helsen and Schmittlein (1992) 
Raju (1992) 
Jedidi et al. (1999) 
Narasimhan (1988) 
 
Market  and  category characteristics 
 
Variance in shares Bawa et al. (1989) Raju (1992) 
Bell et al. (1999) 
Bawa et al. (1989) 
Nijs et al. (2001) 
 
Number of SKUs  Narasimhan et al. (1996) 
 
 
Storability Bell et al. (1999) 
Pauwels et al. (2001) 
Narasimhan et al. (1996) 
Bell et al. (1999) 
Raju (1992) 
Pauwels et al. 2001 
Wansink et al. (1998) 
Ailawadi and Neslin (1998) 
Nijs et al. (2001) 
 
 
  
Table 8: Correlation matrix among brand, market structure and category characteristics  
 
 
Characteristic 
 
National 
brand 
 
Market 
share 
 
Promotional 
frequency 
 
Promotional 
depth 
 
Variance of 
shares 
 
Number of 
SKUS 
 
 
Storability 
 
National brand 
 
1.00 
 
-0.29 
 
0.02 
 
-0.23 
  
0.08 
 
 0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
Market share   1.00 0.05  0.02 -0.18 -0.18 -0.06 
 
Promotional frequency   1.00  0.04  0.09  0.11 -0.04 
 
Promotional depth     1.00 -0.16 -0.06  0.13 
 
Variance of shares      1.00  0.35  0.23 
 
Number of SKUs       1.00  0.18 
 
Storability         1.00
  
Table 9: Moderating role of brand, market structure and category characteristics on total price-promotion elasticities* 
(standardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
Promotional Impact Drivers 
 
Manufacturer revenue 
 
Retailer revenue 
 
Retailer margin 
 
 
Brand characteristics 
 
   
 
National brands 
 
 --- 
 
-0.027 (0.063) 
 
0.020 (0.070) 
 
Market share 
 
-0.212 (0.090)*** 
 
 0.005 (0.053) 
 
-0.200 (0.064)*** 
 
Promotional frequency 
 
 0.144 (0.071)** 
 
 0.063 (0.036)* 
 
-0.100 (0.05)** 
 
Promotional depth 
 
-0.029 (0.127) 
 
-0.176 (0.069)*** 
 
-0.245 (0.076)*** 
 
Market and category characteristics 
 
   
 
Variance of shares 
 
 0.049 (0.090) 
 
 0.055 (0.048) 
 
-0.023 (0.092) 
 
Number of SKUs  
 
-0.237 (0.076)*** 
 
-0.084 (0.039)** 
 
0.074 (0.079) 
 
Storability 
 
 0.141 (0.070)** 
 
 
 0.104 (0.044)*** 
 
0.068 (0.066) 
*** = p < 0.01 
**   = p < 0.05 
*     = p < 0.10 
  
  
Fig. 1: Impulse-Response functions
A: Impulse response function of a price promotion B: Impulse response function of a price promotion 
of one cent per ounce on manufacturer revenue  of one cent per ounce on retailer revenue  
C: Impulse response function of a price promotion D: Impulse response function of a price promotion 
of one cent per ounce on manufacturer revenue  of one cent per ounce on retailer revenue  
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Footnotes 
                                                           
1 Henceforth, we will use the term “retailer margin” to refer to the total dollar margin (gross profit) of the 
retailer for all the brands in the category, while the term “per-unit margin” refers to the percentage gross 
margin for a particular brand. 
 
2 In case of level stationary series, the δ parameters becomes zero. In case of unit-root series (as determined 
on the basis of regular and structural-break unit-root tests), the model is estimated in first differences, i.e. Xt 
is replaced by Xt = Xt – X t-1. When different unit-root series are found to be cointegrated, the model in 
differences is augmented with an error-correction term that captures the system’s gradual adjustment 
towards a long-run equilibrium (see Powers et al. 1991 for a detailed technical exposition). In the case 
where the break date is endogenously determined (cf. infra), we added additional dummy variables in the 
VAR model corresponding to this break date. 
 
3 VAR models as given in equation (1) are very flexible to capture all kinds of lagged effects. To capture 
instantaneous effects as well, the simultaneous-shocking approach introduced by Evans and Wells (1983) 
and used in a marketing setting by Dekimpe and Hanssens (1999) and Nijs et al. (2001) is adopted. 
 
4 Product categories in which the most successful new-product introduction was able to capture a market 
share in excess of 5% during at least 3 consecutive months were labeled as having witnessed a “major new-
product introduction.” 
 
5 All results are generated using Eviews4 software. 
 
6 In the cases where the break dates are identified by the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test, the break dates are 
close enough to the new product introduction -- plus or minus 4 weeks -- that we can still attribute the break 
in the price series to the new product introduction. 
 
7 The magnitude of these periods is shorter when we impose a higher standard of statistical significance, but 
the conclusions about stronger price inertia remain. 
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